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Abstract
This article takes a closer look at the United States’ domestic preparedness program.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the domestic preparedness program has served as the United States’
disaster response and management option in the case of a biological or chemical weapons attack.
In its early years, the program focused solely on chemical weapons, but eventually expanded to
cover the threat of biological weapons as well. The program, however, is fragmented, leaving
authority in the hands of over a dozen different agencies. This leaves the authorities, capabilities,
and resources needed to effectively implement the program divided across multiple bureaucracies.
In addition, the program is essentially made up of a series of legislative initiatives, causing it to be
desperately uncoordinated. Given this organizational fragmentation, we ask: does the domestic
preparedness program really prepare the United States for a biological weapons attack?
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In June 2001, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense 
Strategies, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Analytic 
Services Institute for Homeland Security, and the Oklahoma National Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism held a tabletop exercise titled “Dark 
Winter.” Using a simulated covert smallpox attack of conservative 
communicability levels, the exercise demonstrated the extensive lack of 
preparedness within the United States for a biological terrorist attack. 1  
This exercise, conducted only months before the 9/11 attacks, raised the 
level of awareness regarding U.S. policymakers experience dealing with domestic 
biological terrorism. This article will explore the history of the United States’ 
Domestic Preparedness program as it pertains to biological weapons to provide a 
realistic picture of U.S. levels of preparedness. In analyzing the program’s history 
and structure we will use Bureaucratic Politics and Crisis Management theories to 
evaluate the current Domestic Preparedness program and propose solutions to 
create a more fortified domestic preparedness strategy for the future. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics & Crisis Management 
 
The study of bureaucratic politics has been a focus of scholars for many years, 
dating back to the time of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson. It has only been 
within the last 50 years, however, with the need to find alternative explanations 
for state behavior in international relations, that bureaucratic politics has become 
an acceptable explanatory variable. In public administration, bureaucratic politics 
sees policymaking as a pluralistic endeavor with multiple stakeholders—be it 
organizations or individuals, each vying to have their say.2 
Today, scholars are still wrestling with how to use bureaucratic politics as 
an explanatory variable because “international relations scholars have tended to 
treat bureaucratic politics as an invariant feature of the foreign policy process 
instead of as a contingent phenomenon whose form and intensity vary across 
situations, policy domains, and national administrative systems.”3 Accordingly, 
scholars sought to study bureaucratic politics as a dependent variable. One 
example is Rosati (1981), who examines both the decision structure and the 
decision context. The decision structure is defined as the degree of top-level 
involvement in the decision-making process and the decision context is the 
                                                      
1 O’Toole, Tara, Michael Mair, Thomas V. Inglesby. (2002). “Shining Light on ‘Dark Winter’”. 
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 34.7, pp. 972-983. 
2 Uriel Rosenthal, Paul ‘t Hart, and Alexander Kouzmin (1991), “The Bureau-Politics of Crisis-
Management, Public Administration, vol. 69, Summer, p. 211-232.  
3 Thomas Preston and Paul ‘t Hart, (1999), “Understanding and Evaluating Bureaucratic Politics: 
The Nexus Between Political Leaders and Advisory Systems,” Political Psychology, vol. 20.1, p. 
55. 
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critical and non-critical nature of the issue in the broader external setting. As a 
result, Rosati (1981) hypothesizes that bureaucratic politics will most likely 
emerge in middle-range issues. Here, moderate issue salience causes executive 
involvement to be low and many bureaucratic actors enter the decision-making 
arena.4  
Moreover, the ubiquity of bureaucratic politics raises complex normative 
questions about the “legitimation and distribution of bureaucratic power in the 
administrative system”.5 These questions have been raised frequently in public 
administration and often refer to studies of actors’ motivations based on Miles’ 
law.  In foreign policy and by extension, homeland security, bureaucratic politics 
is often described as a one-dimensional battle for power at the executive level 
whereby “[o]ne may, at best, respect the crafty gamesmanship of certain players, 
but underneath there is a fundamental unease with the idea of bureaucrats 
operating in self-consciously political ways”6 Moreover, policymaking is also a 
goal-seeking activity and in policymaking values and goals are viewed through 
diverging interpretations.7 
 Preston and ’t Hart (1999) sought to marry these two interpretations by 
providing an empirical and normative conceptualization of bureaucratic politics. 
They take into account the structure of the policymaking arena as well as the 
policymaking process in their development of an operational definition of 
bureaucratic politics. Bureaucratic politics has six key features: 
1. There are multiple bureaucratic actors in the policymaking arena 
(structure). 
2. These actors have diverging and conflicting interests, and they are 
involved in multiple-n game contexts with one another, requiring 
cooperation in areas of disagreement because of the necessity for 
future policy interaction (structure). 
3. Power relationships between these actors are diffuse; for example, 
some institutional, bureaucratic, or inner-circle actors are more 
powerful than other actors in certain policy contexts, and not as 
powerful in others (structure). 
4. Interaction is characterized by continuous “pulling and hauling” 
and bargaining between (clusters of) actors (process). 
                                                      
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Thomas Preston and Paul ‘t Hart, (1999), “Understanding and Evaluating Bureaucratic Politics: 
The Nexus Between Political Leaders and Advisory Systems,” Political Psychology, vol. 20.1, p. 
55. 
7 Ibid. 
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5. Decisions are reached by bargaining, coalition formation, and 
compromise building between different parties (process). 
6. Decisions outcomes tend to be sensitive to temporal slippage (e.g., 
time gaps and delays between decision-making and actual 
implementation) and content slippage (e.g. post-decisional 
modification of the content of the policy) (process).8 
 
Throughout the decision-making process, each of these features occurs at varying 
times and intensity. Thus, Preston and ’t Hart (1999) argue that bureaucratic 
politics can be viewed as a continuum. On one end, bureaucratic politics can be 
viewed as bureaucratic consensus seeking—consisting of low intensity, with 
relatively few players whose views and interests differ only gradually, bargaining 
toward consensus within a closed policy arena featuring clear rules of the game 
and a relatively transparent power structure.9 On the other end of the continuum, 
is bureaucratic confrontation—there are many players vigorously pushing and 
hauling their parochial viewpoints in a “relatively open and ill-structured 
constellation of forces”.10  
This conceptualization of bureaucratic politics offers a useful framework 
to discuss domestic preparedness. As discussed above, there are multiple actors 
who have a stake in the Domestic Preparedness Program—a program whose 
primary purpose is to defend our country against crises such as a WMD attack. 
Therefore, it is useful to examine the crisis management literature to offer 
additional insight into the bureaupolitics of the Domestic Preparedness Program.  
Crises are focusing events that turn attention to a policy failure or policy 
problem.11 During crises, the public “look(s) at their leaders: presidents and 
mayors, local politicians and elected administrators, public managers and top civil 
servants….to avert the threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at 
hand.”12  This is crisis management. As Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and 
Bengt Sundelius (2005) argue, “….[P]olicymakers must supervise operational 
aspects of the crisis management operation, communicate with stakeholders, 
discover what went wrong, account for their actions, initiate ways of 
improvement, and (re)establish a sense of normalcy. The notion ‘crisis 
management’…is therefore shorthand for a set of interrelated and extraordinary 
governance challenges.”13   
                                                      
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 John W. Kingdon. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edition. New York: 
Harper Collins, 94-100. 
12 Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius.  The Politics of Crisis Management.  
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 1. 
13 Ibid. 
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Accordingly, leadership plays a significant role in crisis management. 
Crisis leadership involves five critical tasks: sense making, decision making, 
meaning making, terminating and learning to understand the political dimensions 
inherent in crisis management.14 In sense making, leaders must appraise a threat 
and decipher the crisis from “vague, ambivalent, and contradictory signals”.15 
Crisis decision making is made at multiple levels and requires interagency and 
intergovernmental coordination “….of many different groups or agencies 
involved in the implementation of crisis decisions; these organizations are all 
under the pressure to adapt rapidly and effectively”16 In a crisis, leaders are 
supposed to reduce uncertainty, inform the public what is going on, and what 
response is needed. In other words, leaders “impute ‘meaning’ to the unfolding 
crisis in such a way that their efforts to manage it are enhanced.”17 Crisis 
termination is a process whereby emergency is shifted back to the routine while 
simultaneously taking account of what has happened.18 Finally, leaders must learn 
from crises. As Boin et. al. argue, “The crisis experience offers a reservoir of 
potential lessons for contingency planning and training for future crisis.”19 
 In addition to studying the role of leadership in crisis management, a 
bureaupolitics approach is used to understand the interagency tensions that exist 
in the planning, response, and post-crisis stages of crisis management.20 
Bureaupolitics in crisis management, according to Rosenthal, et. al. (1991), has 
four causes: First, in crisis situations government leaders and agencies do not lose 
interest in the ranking order of power and prestige. Second, government leaders 
and agencies are aware and may anticipate the re-allocation of personnel and 
budgetary resources after the crisis based on their performance during the crisis. 
Third, bureaupolitics could result from leaders and agencies who have not worked 
together. Fourth, in a crisis, bureaupolitics may flourish because all parties 
involved are convinced they are making a positive contribution to the public 
cause.”21      
 Bureaupolitics is an ever-present force in crisis management, and the 
Domestic Preparedness Program is not exempt from its influence. To better 
understand its impact on our national security, we now turn to an examination of 
bureaupolitics present in U.S. domestic preparedness. This examination will 
                                                      
14 Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius.  The Politics of Crisis Management.  
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Uriel Rosenthal, Paul ‘t Hart, and Alexander Kouzmin (1991), “The Bureau-Politics of Crisis-
Management, Public Administration, vol. 69, Summer, p. 211-232.  
21 Ibid 
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highlight fragmentation in the program and the potentially deadly consequences 
of a biological terrorist attack. 
 
History of the U.S. Domestic Preparedness Program 
 
The United States’ Domestic Preparedness program began following a series of 
high profile terrorist attacks in the early 1990s, including the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, the 1995 nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway, and the 1995 
bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building.22 These three incidents, 
occurring within a two-year span, created intense interest in terrorism and a 
growing concern about the threat that terrorism posed to the American people. 
Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the White House issued 
presidential decision directive 39 (PDD-39), which called for increased federal 
agency efforts in terrorism preparedness, but did not provide any funding outside 
the agencies’ existing budgets to do so.23 This directive did little more than 
demonstrate a growing awareness by the Administration of the threat posed by 
terrorism.  
 First responders, Congress, and the Defense Department took much more 
decisive steps than the executive branch in creating practical policy initiatives. 
Following the Tokyo subway attacks, the U.S. Marine Corps created the Chemical 
and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which consolidated the bulk of 
USMC’s existing chemical and biological defense capabilities into a single unit.24  
Around this same time, first responders from New York City and Washington, 
D.C. began to advocate for better equipment and training.25   
 Following the push towards greater preparedness on the domestic front, 
Congress passed the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 
better known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment. This legislation made 
$100 million available in FY 1997 for training for federal, state, and local 
personnel, regarding emergency response to weapons of mass destruction.26 
While this program was originally established within the Department of Defense, 
the act contained a provision allowing the president to transfer the program to 
                                                      
22 Falkenrath, Richard.  (2001).  “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic 
Terrorist Attack.” International Security, 25.4, pp. 147-186. 
23 Falkenrath, Richard. (2001).  “Problems with Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic 
Terrorist Attack.”  International Security, 25.4, pp. 147-186. 
24 For more information on CBIRF, see “Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force,” 
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/CBIRF/cbirf.htm  
25 Falkenrath, Richard. (2001). “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic 
Terrorist Attack.” International Security, 25.4, pp. 147-186. 
26 The Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act was part of the FY 1997 defense 
authorization act signed on September 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201. Falkenrath, Richard.  
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another federal agency in two years.27 When the legislation was written, most 
assumed that FEMA would take over the agency when the two-year time period 
was up. When the time came, however, FEMA choose not to take over the 
program for budgetary reasons. FEMA’s budget was significantly smaller than 
DOD’s and they feared that if they accepted responsibility for the program, they 
would not receive the resources necessary to implement it.28    
 FEMA’s refusal to take over the program meant that the agency only 
played a minor role in the Domestic Preparedness Program and that the domestic 
preparedness program did not have a home for most of 1997-1998. In 1999, the 
Clinton Administration transferred authority for the program to the Department of 
Justice.29 The DOJ had played a central role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts with 
the FBI serving as the lead agency for crisis management of terrorist incidents.  
The FBI and the DOJ had the ability to investigate and prosecute crimes, but they 
do not have the ability to provide technical and financial assistance to state and 
local agencies, which further complicates the fragmentation of authority.  
 In FY 1997, the National Institute of Justice, an arm of DOJ, which 
supports state and local law enforcement agencies, received a Congressional 
earmark of $10 million to develop new counterterrorism technologies.30 During 
this same time the Bureau of Justice Assistance began a training program to equip 
emergency service personnel to handle mass disasters and, the following year, 
Congress gave $17 million for a new program called the Special Equipment and 
Training Grant Program, which was implemented by the DOJ. In order to 
implement this program, however, the DOJ had to establish the Office of State 
and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, which had an identical mission to that 
of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program.31 Also during the late 1990s, the FBI 
increased its counterterrorism efforts by investing in specialized capabilities like 
Hazardous Materials Response Unit and enhancing their analytical capabilities for 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In 1998, they even created the 
National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) within the FBI.32 The goal of 
NDPO was to provide a single contact point for state and local agencies who were 
                                                      
27 Falkenrath, Richard. (2001). “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic 
Terrorist Attack.” International Security, 25.4, pp. 147-186. 
28 Ibid 
29 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Memorandum on Emergency Response Assistance 
Program, “Subject: Designation of the Attorney General as the Lead Official for the Emergency 
Response Assistance Program under Sections 1412 and 1415 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201),”  April 6, 2000, 
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gove/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi//oma.eop.gov.us/2000/4/7/7.text.2.  
30 Falkenrath, Richard. (2001). “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic 
Terrorist Attack.” International Security, 25.4, pp. 147-186. 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
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seeking federal preparedness assistance. NDPO failed, however, largely due to a 
lack of Congressional funding. 
 In addition to the bureaucratic posturing and apparent focus on WMD 
preparedness, the Defense Science Board (DSB) examined the DOD’s role in 
domestic preparedness and suggested that the National Guard would be best-
suited for WMD civilian support.33 The creation of National Guard teams for 
WMD support and the DOD’s Joint Task Force Civilian Support helped redefine 
the role of domestic preparedness and meant that the DOD would no longer 
provide training and equipment for civilian responders within the DOJ programs.  
Instead, they would develop and maintain specialized domestic response 
capabilities.34 
 As the fragmentation within the domestic preparedness structure 
increased, experts became more vocal in their criticism. They attacked the 
program for duplication, poor coordination, incoherence, and unclear or incorrect 
priorities.35 One of the largest points of confusion was the almost non-existent 
role played by FEMA. Many of these problems were caused by the ad hoc nature 
of the program, which meant that the executive branch had no authority to 
coordinate the program as a whole. In 1998, the White House finally did take 
some initiative, however, by issuing PDD-62, which upgraded and enlarged the 
National Security Council’s (NSC) responsibility for coordinating federal 
counterterrorism, domestic preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection 
programs. The NSC still had no authority over budgets or programs, but gave a 
sense of national cohesion and helped direct greater effort towards the threat of 
biological weapons.   
 Since its fragmented construction, the U.S. Domestic Preparedness 
Program has been strongly criticized for its redundancy, lack of coordination, and 
lack of a clear mission.36  Many of these issues are due to its ad hoc beginnings 
and its fragmented authority and funding structure.  These weaknesses received 
renewed attention in 2001, occasioning the creation of a new government agency, 
the Department of Homeland Security to oversee domestic preparedness. 
 September 11, 2001 is the largest terrorist attack on the American 
homeland in United States history. It shocked the country and made us realize that 
we are not as safe as we like to believe. Shortly after the attacks of 9/11 there was 
another high profile terrorist incident, this time involving biological weapons.  
This heightened threat level promoted the creation of the Department of 
                                                      
33 Defense Science Board, DoD Responses to Transnational Threats (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1997). 
34 Falkenrath, Rickard. (2001). “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic 
Terrorist Attack.” International Security, 25.4, pp. 147-186. 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
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Homeland Security (DHS) and an effort to strengthen the United States’ 
preparedness capabilities.  
 In December 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) 
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national domestic 
preparedness goal.37 In September 2007, DHS finally released National 
Preparedness Guidelines, which contained four critical elements. The first 
element was the National Preparedness Vision, which provides a statement of the 
core preparedness goal for the nation. The second element of the Guidelines is the 
National Planning Scenarios. These scenarios depict a diverse set of “high-
consequence” threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters. This contains fifteen different scenarios designed to facilitate planning 
for homeland security preparedness at all levels of government and the private 
sector. The third element is the Universal Task List, which contains 
approximately 1,600 unique tasks that can “facilitate efforts to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from the major events that are represented by the 
National Planning Scenarios.”38 The fourth and final element of the National 
Preparedness Guidelines is the Target Capabilities List. This list defines 37 
capabilities that communities, the private sector, and all levels of government 
must collectively possess in order to respond to disasters effectively.39  These 
Guidelines involve more than 1,500 federal, state, and local officials, and over 
120 national organizations, yet it is unclear whether it solves the problems of 
fragmentation within the domestic preparedness program.  
 The Guidelines rely heavily on a calculation of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence for specific regions to help determine the exact design of disaster 
preparedness for that area. They outline ways to expand regional collaboration, 
identification of national priorities, and strengthen communication capabilities.  
These Guidelines also work to establish a hierarchy of command in cases of 
domestic terrorist attacks. The Guidelines, however, still must be implemented 
over time through a wide range of preparedness programs and activities. The DHS 
must work with a variety of other homeland security-like agencies to implement 
the suggestions and there is no expanded funding or financial support attached to 
the implementation of the Guidelines.  
 The National Preparedness Guidelines did create new agencies designed to 
provide readiness training and information—the Urban Areas Security Initiative, 
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the Cities Readiness Initiative, 
the Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination, the Information 
Sharing Environment, the Office of Emergency Communications, and dozens of 
                                                      
37 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “National Preparedness Guidelines.” September 2007. 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
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others.40 While this was a well-intentioned attempt to fill in the gaps in the 
domestic preparedness plan, it only served to add more actors and agencies to an 
already overly complicated preparedness structure.   
 The most recent development regarding Domestic Preparedness is 
Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), which was put forth by the Obama 
Administration on March 30, 2011. This directive is aimed specifically at 
systematically increasing the United States national preparedness for acts of 
terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and natural disasters.41 PPD-8 stipulates that 
within 120 days of the release of the directive, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security will develop and submit a national preparedness goal that is informed by 
specific risks and vulnerabilities. This developed goal will also include objectives 
that can help mitigate and reduce these risks and vulnerabilities.42 As the most 
recent development in United States Domestic Preparedness, PPD-8 takes a step 
in the right direction by working to identify threats and develop an integrated 
system to mitigate the risks posed by those threats.  
 Despite the recent potential progress made with the announcement of 
PPD-8, many changes made after 9/11 only increased the fragmentation in the 
domestic preparedness program and have done even less to help the nation 
prepare for a biological weapons attack.  One of the main challenges posed by 
biological weapons is the difficulty in detecting an outbreak and need for an 
increased index of diseases, which would allow for symptoms to be recognized 
earlier.43  None of these issues have yet to be addressed in the changes made to 
the domestic preparedness program after 9/11.   
 
Domestic Preparedness Moving Forward 
  
The first, and arguably the largest problem with the domestic preparedness 
program is that it has—for the most part—failed to address the threat of biological 
terrorism. Though some argue that biological terrorism is not an eminent threat, 
history has proven otherwise. The anthrax attacks of 2001 demonstrated that the 
United States is not immune to the threat of biological attack. The 2001 attack 
resulted in 21 cases of anthrax contamination and several deaths. This is just one 
example of biological weapons usage, but they have been used for centuries 
because of their low cost of production, ease of transmission, and difficulty to 
detect.  In addition, biological terrorism can be particularly difficult to prepare for 
                                                      
40 Department of Homeland Security. “National Preparedness Guidelines.” September 2007.  
41 Department of Homeland Security. “Presidential Policy Directive/ PPD-8: National 
Preparedensess.” March 2011. 
42 Ibid 
43 Leggiadro, Robert J., MD. (2000). "The Threat of Biological Terrorism: A Public Health and 
Infection Control Reality." Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology 21.1, pp. 53-56 
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in the public policy arena because “inputs to biological weapons are inherently 
‘dual-use’…The same equipment used to produce beer, for example, could be 
used to produce biological agents.”44 To be effective, federal, state, and local 
governments must understand the restrictions and find the best ways to protect the 
public.   
 If the United States is to have a completely effective domestic 
preparedness policy there are several elements that must be changed. The first is 
to transform our policy into one of preparedness instead of reactiveness. The 
second is to develop leadership in the area of domestic preparedness. The third, 
though along the same vein as the second, is to create a centralized department 
under which all domestic preparedness elements falls. This will help do away 
with the fragmentation issues and the lack of leadership. The final element that 
must be changed to create an effective domestic preparedness program is greater 
intergovernmental communication as, currently, authority for many elements of 
the domestic preparedness program fall under a host of different state, local, and 
federal agencies. Even if authority was centralized under one federal department, 
intergovernmental communication would remain a vital element to proper 
preparedness and response.  We now address each element in turn to offer 
prescriptions for a more effective domestic preparedness policy. 
 
Preparedness Instead of Reactiveness  
 
All of the United States preparedness programs—biological, chemical, nuclear, or 
otherwise—are reactive in nature. As a nation, we are always fighting the last war 
and, therefore, are never really prepared for the next. For example, we have 
significantly heightened our security at airports following the 9/11 attacks and 
have implemented a law mandating passports to travel between the United States 
and Canada, but we have not addressed the serious security failings of our 
seaports. Because there has not yet been an incident at our ports, it has not 
become a top priority for policy-makers.   
In order to create a greater domestic preparedness system, we must look 
towards the future to recognize what the threats of today and tomorrow may be.  
This is not an easy task, as it requires recognizing and preparing for the 
unimaginable. Before 9/11, few Americans would have thought that terrorists 
hijacking an aircraft and crashing it into the World Trade Center was a viable 
threat, but that is exactly what happened. To prevent such tragedies in the future 
we need to think more like the terrorists we are fighting. Once something has 
been tried it will likely not be tried again. We need to analyze our areas of 
national security and find the most likely places for terrorist to target next—such 
                                                      
44 Stern, Jessica (2003). Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. NY: 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
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as our sea ports or our subway systems. The lack of security at ports (with 
approximately 1% of cargo being inspected) makes it a perfect environment to 
move nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons into the country. Additionally, our 
subway and metro systems, particularly throughout the Northeast, make an 
excellent target for an aerosol biological attack because the wind from the moving 
cars would push the disease throughout the transportation system. Moving away 
from reactiveness will require us to step outside our metaphorical boxes and 
imagine the unimaginable. 
 To accomplish this we must use our resources, such as terrorism experts, 
disease experts, and economic experts and take seriously their prognosis of what 
the greatest threats to the United States are and will be.  They can give us 
information about vulnerable infrastructures and economic systems that will help 
us understand the most vital places to put our limited resources. This will require 
taking risks and providing funding for crises that haven’t happened yet, an often 
difficult task for policy-makers to justify to their constituents. However, this is the 
only way that we will be prepared for the next attack instead of being reactive to 
it. As Kettl notes, “It is hard for responders to plan a response without closely 
coordinating their work with the officials analyzing the threats.  It is even harder 
to develop the critical close partnerships among all the participants if there are 
artificial dividing lines between preparedness and response.”45 Thus, to address 
this “’deficiency of federalism’” we need to build organizations that are nimble 
and “….can rise to the challenges of the problems we face.”46   
 
Centralized Organization 
 
The most severe problem with the current domestic preparedness program is its 
lack of centralized authority. As previously mentioned, because each portion of 
the program was created by separate legislation, agencies only have leadership 
and funding authority over small portions of the program. This creates an 
inefficient, duplicated, and fragmented program. The lack of coordination within 
the various elements will make it nearly impossible to have an effective response 
if the United States is ever the subject of a significant bioterrorism attack.   
This is not a problem that can be solved easily, but there is an established 
agency that would be best suited for taking on the duties of domestic preparedness 
authority. The Department of Homeland Security, created after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, is tasked specifically with protecting the American homeland. Although it 
can be argued that DHS has its own coordination issues, it is the most effective 
place to bring all of the elements of the current domestic preparedness program 
                                                      
45 Kettl, Donald F. (2007).  System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics: 
Second Edition.   Washington, D.C.: CQ Press., p. 78-9. 
46 Ibid 
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together. DHS already has departments and programs in: analyzing and sharing 
information; protecting infrastructure, aviation security, chemical security, law 
enforcement, and more. They also have 13 different organizations that focus 
specifically on different areas of preparedness, including FEMA. If we are to have 
an effective domestic preparedness program, FEMA will have to take a 
significantly larger role.  
FEMA is our government’s Federal Emergency Management Agency—as 
the name implies—and already has established lines of communication and 
command spanning state, local, and federal governments. The United States must 
take advantage of this existing structure. Additionally, FEMA’s mission is to 
respond to federal emergencies, under which a biological attack would fall. 
Without FEMA taking up a larger management role, the Domestic Preparedness 
Program will have a difficult time meeting its full preparedness and response 
potential.  
Centralizing the Domestic Preparedness Program under the Department of 
Homeland Security and giving FEMA a role in the program are the best chance 
for the United States to have a strong preparedness policy with all of the military 
and financial backing it would need to be effective. There also needs to be a 
biological security division added under DHS to prepare for threats that extend 
beyond chemical and aviation security, as there is currently no portion of DHS 
dedicated solely to the threat of bioterrorism. Without this element of 
centralization of authority, the United States cannot have maximum effectiveness 
in our domestic preparedness program. 
Thus, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness, improved leadership is 
needed within government agencies. Leaders in crises need to be able to make 
sense of events, and make decisions to coordinate response. As Boin, et. al. argues 
“To be sure, planning the organization of crisis decision-making and 
implementation can benefit the effectiveness of crisis management efforts. The 
secret lies in the planning process: by working on response issues, participants 
become sensitive to problems that may emerge during a crisis.”47 This additional 
planning allows leaders in one agency to understand the needs of leaders in other 
agencies within Homeland Security. Ideally, a leader is someone who will 
“establish partnerships among the players: to define the mission that had to be 
met; to identify the contributions of each organization to that mission; and to 
motivate everyone to contribute their part”48 This is known as creating unity of 
effort.  
 
                                                      
47 Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius.  The Politics of Crisis Management.  
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 1. 
48 Kettl, Donald F. (2007).  System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics: 
Second Edition.   Washington, D.C.: CQ Press., p. 78-9. 
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Intergovernmental Communication & Response 
 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, one of the biggest criticisms was the lack of 
coordination and communication between agencies. Even if the program was 
consolidated under a centralized authority, the process could not be effectively 
managed without better intergovernmental and intra-agency communication. As 
Donald Kettl argues: 
 
The key to an effective homeland security system is, in fact, 
connecting the dots—ensuring strong coordination among those 
responsible for prevention and those charged with response. No 
single agency, no single level of government—indeed, no 
government itself, without the active partnership of its citizens—
can hope to forestall attack. Should an attack occur, no one agency, 
level of government—or even government itself—can adequately 
respond. Homeland security is, indeed, at its core a problem of 
coordination.49 
 
Therefore, an important necessity in reforming domestic preparedness is 
communication between federal, state, and local government particularly with 
first responders.  
 In any attack, first responders, as the name implies, are the first on the 
scene and every effort must be done to ensure the free flow of information. In 
many cities and counties in the U.S., as analyst Stephen Flynn notes, “….[T[here 
is no interoperable communications system to facilitate police, fire departments, 
and county, state, regional, and federal response personnel communicating with 
one another during a major emergency.”50 Moreover, there is a lack of 
communication equipment for first responders to have secure communications 
with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials as well as 
National Guard leaders.51 A 2003 Council on Foreign Relations report declared 
that funding for emergency responders at all levels was vastly underfunded and 
the funds that were allocated “were sidetracked and stalled due to a politicized 
appropriations process, the slow distribution of funds by federal agencies, and 
bureaucratic red tape at all levels of government, according to GAO reports.”52 
                                                      
49 Ibid 
50 Stephen Flynn.  (2005).  America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect 
Us from Terrorism.   New York: Harper Perennial, 127. 
51 Ibid 
52 Charles Perrow (2007).  The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, 
Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 98-9. 
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 Also, the use of the National Guard poses an important dilemma for 
intergovernmental cooperation. The National Guard is commanded by state 
governors unless called up for federal service. As Frances E. Winslow argues, 
“[T]he WMD/NBC mission was announced by federal authorities without 
consultation with state organizations responsible for the Guard. While Guard units 
are actively seeking missions in the post-Cold War era, the WMD/NBC mission 
may not be a good use of the $49 million being assigned”53 Winslow wrote the 
above statement prior to 9/11, and could not have taken into account the 
economic, political, and emotional impact resulting from multiple deployments in 
the War on Terror to Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of the wars, the multiple 
deployments of six months or more left the National Guard’s state duties strained 
with limited troops and equipment available, as was evidenced in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.54   
 Most importantly, if the program were to be centralized underneath the 
Department of Homeland Security it would require effective and efficient intra-
agency communication to ensure that the process is better managed than before it 
was centralized. Without the establishment of a hierarchy and reporting structure 
within the, what would be, newly expanded DHS, the fragmentation would most 
likely continue. To be most effective there would need to be a department focused 
solely on the threat of biological weapons, as mentioned earlier. Within this 
department there would need to be individuals that reported directly to: the 
Transportation Security Administration; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; FEMA; and the U.S. Coast Guard. In turn, there would need to be 
specialists within each of these aforementioned organizations that would report 
directly to the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security. This specialization 
in biosecurity and biological threats, combined with high-level access, would 
allow for the Domestic Preparedness Program to be better managed.      
 
Conclusion 
 
From its inception, the U.S. Domestic Preparedness Program was strongly 
criticized for its redundancy, lack of coordination, and absence of a clear mission. 
The current fragmented and uncoordinated system is piecemeal at best with many 
areas of authority lacking funding or the physical ability to carry out their duties.  
Duplication of programs in several areas also added to the confusion. The threat 
                                                      
53 Frances E. Winslow, (2001), “Planning for Weapons of Mass Destruction/Nuclear, Bilogical, 
and Chemical Agents: A Local/Federal Partnership”, Handbook of Crisis and Emergency 
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of biological terrorism is real and becoming an even greater threat with our 
increasingly globalized world. The United States must recognize this threat and 
commit to making the necessary changes to truly protect our population.  
 Unfortunately, domestic preparedness today is a crisis in the making.  
However, we have the ability to be proactive instead of reactive to this threat, but 
it will require a substantial overhaul of our current preparedness policy. The 
fragmentation currently present in the program, the disparate number of actors 
and agencies involved is a bureaucratic problem that can be remedied if 
preparedness is emphasized through a centralization of the Domestic 
Preparedness Program into the Department of Homeland Security.   
DHS offers the opportunity for greater leadership and intergovernmental 
cooperation between the federal, state, and local levels of government regarding 
biological weapons. The establishment of a department whose sole focus is on the 
threat of biological weapons would pool the knowledge and expertise of a number 
of different agencies responsible for security and disaster response. Furthermore, 
centralization affords leaders opportunities for inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation taking advantage of lessons learned to create unity of effort and, 
ultimately, effective domestic preparedness. 
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